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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §77-35-26(2)(a) (1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2a-3(2)(f) (1953 as amended) whereby a defendant in a district 
court criminal action may take on appeal to the Court of Appeals from 
a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a first 
degree or capital felony. In this case, the Honorable David S. 
Young, Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, rendered final judgment and conviction against 
Mr. Pacheco for Burglary, a second degree felony, and Theft, a 
Class B misdemeanor. 
v 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Were the identification procedures used by police 
officers violative of Mr. Pacheco's due process rights? 
2. (A) Did the trial court err in allowing admission 
into evidence of a mugshot of Mr. Pacheco? (B) Did the court err in 
denying Mr. Pacheco's pretrial motion to suppress evidence of his 
prior conviction of Attempted Burglary? 
3. Was the evidence insufficent to support convictions of 
Burglary and Theft? 
vi 
TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or 
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of 
War or public danger; nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation. 
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution (in part) 
. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Article I, Section 7, Constitution of Utah 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Article I, Section 12, Constitution of Utah 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process 
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in which 
the offense is alleged to have been committed and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final judgment, 
vii 
be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
a wife shall not be compelled to testify against 
her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense. 
TEXT OF STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-19(c) 
(c) No party may assign as error any portion 
of the charge or omission therefrom unless he 
objects thereto before the jury is instructed, 
stating distinctly the matter to which he objects 
and the ground of his objection. Notwithstanding 
a party's failure to object, error may be assigned 
to instructions in order to avoid a manifest 
injustice. 
TEXT OF RULES 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, 
confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; 
exceptions; other crimes. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible 
to prove the character of a person in order to 
show that he acted in conformity therewith. It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, 
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence 
of mistake or accident. 
viii 
Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime. 
General rule. For the purpose of attacking the 
credibility of a witness, evidence that he has 
been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if 
elicited from him or established by public record 
during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) 
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess 
of one year under the law under which he was 
convicted, and the court determines that the 
probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, 
or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, 
regardless of the punishment. 
ix 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
ROBERT PAUL PACHECO, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880281-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
Burglary, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-202 (1953 as amended), and Theft, a Class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as amended), following a 
jury trial held March 24-25, 1988, in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
David S. Young, Judge, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On April 7, 1987, at approximately 3:30 p.m., Josephine 
Eward noticed a blue and white car drive up her street and park near 
the front of her neighbors' home, located directly across the street 
from her own home. Mrs. Eward saw a male emerge from the vehicle 
and go to the front door of the home of Ray and Katherine Welch 
(T. 14). The male knocked several times on the door (T. 16). 
Mrs. Eward described him as being thin and wearing a red, black and 
blue plaid shirt (T. 17). Mrs. Eward watched this male through lace 
curtains covering her front room window and testified that the lace 
curtains were hard to see through (T. 17). 
Mrs. Eward testified that when no one answered the door, 
the male turned and ran down five stairs, jumped across the lawn, 
jumped across a small cement retaining wall, ran to his car, and 
then drove off really fast (T. 18-19, 22). She did not see the man 
enter the house or ever return to the house (T. 21). Mrs. Eward was 
later shown photographs of possible suspects and identified a young 
man as the person she had seen at the Welch's door (T. 21). 
Connie Luna, a neighbor who lived kitty-corner from the 
Welches, testified that at approximately 3:30-4:00 p.m. on April 7, 
1987, she came out on her porch to wait for her husband to return 
from work and that she noticed a guy across the street walking 
through the field next to the Welch home (T. 45-46). Mrs. Luna 
could only see him from the back but she observed him jump a five 
foot high fence leading to the Welch home (T. 46). She believed 
that he might be taking a short cut and thought nothing more about 
it (T. 46-47). She returned inside her home (T. 47). 
A few moments later, she heard Ray Welch hollering, "Wait 
or Hey you/ and Mrs. Luna came out of her house (T. 47). She 
observed a male running from across the street (T. 47). Mrs. Luna 
yelled at the male; he looked at her and then drove off in a car 
that he had parked near her driveway (T. 47). 
Mrs. Luna said she was approximately twenty feet from the 
male at the closest point and that he was wearing a red checked 
shirt that looked like tweed material and beige pants (T. 51). 
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Mrs. Luna testified that the car was blue and white and that the 
license number was 988 AWL (T. 48-49). A photograph of that vehicle 
was later shown to Mrs. Luna, and she identified it as the car the 
man had left in (T. 48-49). 
Ray Welch testified that at approximately 4:00 p.m. on 
April 7, 1987/ he took a break from working in his yard and went in 
the back door of his home. While inside, he noticed a movement in 
his kitchen; he looked closer and saw a man run past a small hallway 
in his house (T. 36). He was eighteen to twenty feet away and 
testified he did not get a good look at the man (T. 36). The man 
ran through the dining room and out his front door (T. 36). 
Mr. Welch said the man wore a sort of plaid shirt, but he was unsure 
about the colors (T. 36-37). The man ran out the door, jumped the 
cement embankment in the front yard, ran fast down the street, got 
into a blue and white car, and drove away (T. 37). Mr. Welch later 
noticed that between four and fifty dollars ($4.00 and $50.00) were 
missing from a wallet that was kept in a dresser drawer (T. 38). 
Mr. Welch could not identify Mr. Robert Pacheco as the man who ran 
from his home that day (T. 42). 
Katherine Welch was working in her side yard when she 
heard her husband yell. She ran over to the fence and saw someone 
run out her door. She described the person as a slender male 
wearing a red and white checkered shirt of a heavier material and 
beige or tan colored pants (T. 26). Mrs. Welch only saw the man 
from the back and not the face (T. 26). She said he moved rapidly, 
ran fast, jumped off the cement bank, and ran to a blue and white 
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car parked down the street (T. 29). She estimated the person's age 
at somewhere between twenty-eight to thirty years old, not a 
teenager, nor sixty years old, and maybe forty years old (T. 30). 
She admitted to be bad at guessing ages, especially where she had 
only seen him from the back; she thought him to be younger because 
he moved so quickly (T. 30). He had run without a limp (T. 30). 
Detective Paul LaMont, now retired but then of the Salt 
Lake Police Department, was the follow-up investigator for the 
burglary of the Welch home. He ran a check on the license number of 
the blue and white car that Mrs. Luna had given police officers, 
finding Robert Paul Pacheco to be the registered owner; counsel 
stipulated at trial that Mr. Pacheco was the registered owner of 
that car (T. 75). Detective LaMont then obtained a driver's license 
photograph of Mr. Pacheco (Exhibit 8-S); and with five other 
driver's license photographs, the detective prepared a photospread 
to show to Mrs. Luna (T. 77-78). Mrs. Luna was unable to positively 
identify any photograph as the man she had seen on April 7, 1987 
(T. 62, 79). She did, however, tell the detective that the 
photograph of Mr. Pacheco could be the person but she was not sure 
(T. 62-63, 79). The detective told her that she pointed him out and 
that he would find a better picture (T. 64). Several weeks later, 
Detective LaMont returned to Mrs. Luna with a new photospread of six 
mug shot photographs paperclipped in a folder marked, "'MUG1 SHOW-UP 
FOLDER" (Exhibit 6-S) (T. 65). Robert Paul Pacheco was the only 
individual repeated in both photospreads (T. 63, 65, 72, 86). 
Moreover, before showing Mrs. Luna the second photospread, Detective 
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LaMont informed her that the suspect was included in the photospread 
(T. 72). Mrs. Luna did, in fact, select Mr. Pacheco's photograph 
from the second photospread (T. 59). 
Mrs. Luna admitted at trial that the second photospread 
did not contain pictures of others who resembled Mr. Pacheco; she 
stated that most of those in the photographs were younger and that 
it is obvious that Mr. Pacheco is older (T. 66). Judge Young also 
conceded that four of the photographs were of individuals much 
younger than Mr. Pacheco (T. 94). Defense counsel objected to the 
identification and to the admission into evidence of the exhibit, 
claiming that mug shot photographs by nature were too prejudicial 
(T. 92) and that none of the others in the photospread resembled 
Mr. Pacheco (T. 92-95). The trial court overruled the objection, 
allowed the exhibit into evidence, and thereby permitted Mrs. Luna 
to testify to her identification of Mr. Pacheco through the second 
photospread (T. 94). 
Detective LaMont utilized the second photospread 
identification of Mr. Pacheco by Mrs. Luna to acquire both a search 
warrant of Mr. Pacheco's residence and an arrest warrant for 
Mr. Pacheco (T. 80). Both were executed on May 27, 1987 (T. 80). 
Detective LaMont removed clothing from Mr. Pacheco's 
residence consisting of several shirts and pants (T. 80-81). During 
the trial, Mrs. Luna identified a shirt and a pair of pants as 
looking like the clothes worn by the burglar of the Welch home 
(T. 55). Other clothing taken through the search warrant was 
returned to Mr. Pacheco at trial (T. 95). 
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Prior to trial, Mr. Pacheco moved to suppress evidence of 
his prior convictions pursuant to Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence (R. 37). That motion was apparently argued in chambers, 
off the record, and presumably denied (see Point II, B, infra). 
Mr. Pacheco testified in his own behalf and admitted a prior felony 
conviction of Attempted Burglary in 1981 (T. 115). 
The defense case at trial consisted of testimony by Joyce 
Shiner and Ivy Pacheco, Mr. Pacheco's girlfriend of seven years and 
his mother, respectively. They both testified that Mr. Pacheco 
suffered a broken ankle in 1984, which as of the date of trial, had 
never returned to normal, causing him to limp and preventing him 
from being able to run without falling down (T. 100-02, 112). 
Medical reports were admitted into evidence which verified his ankle 
surgery and medical treatment (Exhibits 10-D and 11-D) (T. 118-19). 
Both testified that Troy Chancier, Robert Pacheco's son, was the 
same size and build of Mr. Pacheco in April of 1987 and that they 
are identical in appearance from the back (T. 103, 105, 110). 
Robert Pacheco took the stand in his own behalf. He 
confirmed earlier testimony that he could not run because of his 
ankle surgery in 1984 (T. 117). He denied burglarizing the Welch 
home and taking the missing money (T. 116-119). Mr. Pacheco, age 
forty-two, testified that his son, Troy chancier, twenty-three years 
old, had borrowed his car on April 7, 1987, from the morning until 
around 5:00 p.m. (T. 116, 119, 121). 
The case was submitted to the jury who returned 
convictions on both counts, Burglary and Theft. 
SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENT 
Police officers violated Mr. Pacheco's due process rights 
when they used suggestive identification procedures such as 
reinforcing an unsure identification of a witness, then repeating a 
show-up utilizing mug shots where Mr. Pacheco's photograph was the 
only one repeated, the officer told the witness that the suspect was 
included, and others in the photospread did not resemble Mr. Pacheco. 
Mr. Pacheco's constitutional rights of due process and a 
fair trial were violated when a mug shot photograph of Mr. Pacheco 
was admitted and published to the jury over objection and where 
evidence of a prior conviction for Attempted Burglary was not 
suppressed but allowed to reach the jurors. 
Insufficient evidence existed to support the convictions 
of Mr. Pacheco because the evidence presented at trial was not such 
that a reasonable jury could have found Mr. Pacheco to have 
committed the crimes as testified to by observing witnesses. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES UTILIZED TO OBTAIN 
IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY AGAINST MR. PACHECO 
VIOLATED HIS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS TO 
DUE PROCESS. 
Mr. Pacheco asserts that the identification procedures 
utilized by Detective Paul LaMont in this case, under the totality 
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of the circumstances, were violative of his due process rights 
guaranteed him by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution. Mr. Pacheco insists that the procedures utilized by 
Detective LaMont were so suggestive that Connie Luna's 
identification of him at trial was unreliable and constituted 
manifest and prejudicial error. Mr. Pacheco therefore urges this 
Court to reverse the convictions which followed the irreparable 
misidentification and remand his case for a trial consistent with 
his due process safeguards intact. 
In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), the 
United States Supreme Court, addressing the issue of suggestive 
show-ups, stated: 
This danger [that the witness may make an 
incorrect identification] will be increased if the 
police display to the witness only the picture of 
a single individual who generally resembles the 
person he saw, or if they show him the pictures of 
several persons among which the photograph of a 
single such individual recurs or is in some way 
emphasized. The chance of misidentification is 
also heightened if the police indicate to the 
witness that they have other evidence that one of 
the persons pictured committed the crime. 
Regardless of how the initial misidentification 
comes about, the witness thereafter is apt to 
retain in his memory the image of the photograph 
rather than of the person actually seen, reducing 
the trustworthiness of subsequent lineup or 
courtroom identification. 
390 U.S. at 383-84 (footnotes omitted). The Court held that 
"convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a 
pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside on that 
ground only if the photographic identification procedure was so 
- 8 -
impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial 
likelihood of irreparable misidentif ication." 16_. at 384. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has adopted the position taken 
in Simmons adding: 
[T]he circumstances of the individual case should 
be scrutinized carefully by the trial court to see 
whether in the identification procedures there was 
anything done which should be regarded as so 
suggestive or persuasive that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the identification was 
not a genuine product of the knowledge and 
recollection of the witness, but was something so 
distorted or tainted that in fairness and justness 
the guilt or innocence of an accused should not be 
allowed to be tested thereby. 
State v. Perry, 492 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Utah 1972). The Supreme Court 
of Utah has further recognized the necessity "to examine the 
totality of the circumstances of an eyewitness identification to 
determine whether the confrontation was so unnecessarily suggestive 
and so conducive to mistaken identification as to result in a denial 
of due process. State v. Marsh, 652 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Utah 1982) 
(citing Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969); and Stovall v. 
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967)). 
Four different people momentarily observed the burglary 
suspect on the afternoon of April 7, 1987. Three of those four, 
Mr. and Mrs. Welch and Josephine Eward, only saw the suspect from 
the back (T. 16, 25, 35). Mr. and Mrs. Welch could not identify 
Mr. Pacheco as the man who burglarized their home (T. 25, 35); 
however, they both believed the suspect to be a younger man because 
of how quickly he had moved (T. 30, 37). Mrs. Eward did select a 
young man from the photographs the police showed to her as the man 
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she had seen at the Welches1 door, not Mr. Pacheco (T. 21). 
Only Connie Luna identified Mr. Pacheco as the man she 
observed on April 7, 1987. That identification/ however, was the 
product of procedures which were so impermissibly suggestive as to 
give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification. The procedures used by Officer LaMont so tainted 
the identification process and were so suggestive that there is a 
very substantial likelihood that the subsequent in-court 
identifications of Mr. Pacheco were products of the police 
photospread procedures rather than a recollection of the perpetrator 
of the crime. 
Officer LaMont utilized procedures in direct conflict 
with the warnings of danger elucidated by the Supreme Court in 
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. at 383-84. Moreover, the 
officer's actions closely paralleled the factual errors found 
violative of due process strictures by the Supreme Court in 
Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969). 
Specifically, Officer LaMont prepared a photospread of 
six suspects using driver's license photographs (T. 77-78). 
Mrs. Luna could not give a positive identification although she did 
state that Mr. Pacheco's photograph could be the person (T. 62-63, 
79). After several weeks, the officer returned with new 
photographs; the new photographs were mug shot photographs and were 
labeled as such (Exhibit 6-S) (T. 65). Mr. Pacheco was the only 
person repeated in both photospreads (T. 63, 65, 72, 86). 
Additionally, the photographs of four of the six individuals in the 
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second photospread were years younger than Mr. Pacheco as attested 
to by both Mrs. Luna and Judge Young (T. 66, 94). The other 
photograph is of an individual more closely comparable to 
Mr. Pacheco's age but who looks nothing like him and has a very 
unique fu-manchu-style moustache (Exhibit 6-S, top left corner) (see 
Addendum A for photocopy reproduction of Exhibit 6-S). Mrs. Luna 
was also inappropriately guided in her identification when the 
officer told her after the first uncertain identification that she 
had pointed him out (T. 64) and prior to the second photospread that 
the police believed the suspect was among the photographs (T. 72). 
As the United States Supreme Court warned in Simmons, the 
practices utilized by the officer herein were such to reduce the 
trustworthiness of the identification itself and £ fortiori the 
subsequent in-court identification. Practically speaking, 
Mr. Pacheco was the sole photograph presented during the second 
photospread. Literally speaking, Mr. Pacheco's photograph was the 
only one emphasized in the second spread, not only because of who 
the other pictures were but also because his was the only photograph 
repeated from the first photospread. The chance for 
misidentification was further heightened because the police officer 
suggested the person who committed the crime was contained in the 
photospread. Cf. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. at 383-84. 
In Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969), the United 
States Supreme Court found that police procedures used for 
identification so undermined the reliability of the only eyewitness 
identification of the accused that due process was violated; the 
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suggestive elements utilized had made it all but inevitable that the 
accused would be identified whether he was, in fact, the 
perpetrator. In Foster, the accused was placed in a lineup with two 
others who were six or seven inches shorter than he; and he, not the 
others, was forced to wear a leather jacket similar to that worn by 
the robber. A positive identification did not follow, however, and 
a second lineup was held a week to ten days later. The accused was 
the only individual repeated from the first lineup and a positive 
identification occurred. 
In the instant case, the first photospread was not 
preserved (T. 83-84) so any taint is uncertain. It is not 
unremarkable, however, that the photograph of Mr. Pacheco used in 
the first photospread showed him wearing a plaid shirt 
(Exhibit 8-S). Yet, Mrs. Luna was unable to make a positive 
identification; she thought that the photograph of Mr. Pacheco could 
be the man (T. 62-63, 79). The second photospread, also held a week 
or two later, was at least as obvious as the Foster lineup. The 
officer indicated the suspect was included. Also, as in Foster, the 
photograph of Mr. Pacheco was the only photograph repeated (T. 65, 
86). As in Foster, the positive identification which followed was 
no surprise. As in Foster, this Court should find that the 
procedures utilized for identification so undermined the reliability 
of the only eyewitness identification of the accused that due 
process was violated. As the suggestive elements utilized made it 
all but inevitable that Mr. Pacheco would be identified, manifest 
and prejudicial error occurred and reversal is warranted. 
- 12 -
Rule 19(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; State v. Kazda, 545 
P.2d 190 (Utah 1976). 
A complete examination of the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding Mrs. Luna's identification further 
supports that her identification was not reliable. The United 
States Supreme Court, in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972), 
categorized the central question of suggestive identification cases 
as "whether under the 'totality of the circumstances' the 
identification was reliable even though the confrontation was 
suggestive." To analyze this question, the Court laid out 
appropriate factors for consideration to be: (1) the opportunity of 
the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, (2) the 
witness' degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of the witness' prior 
description of the criminal, (4) the level of certainty demonstrated 
by the witness at the confrontation, and (5) the length of time 
between the crime and the confrontation. Id. 
Applying these factors to the facts in this case, the 
totality of the circumstances weigh heavily that Mrs. Luna's 
testimony was unreliable and manifest error. Mrs. Luna's 
opportunity to view the criminal was quite limited. She did see 
him, from the back only, on his way to the Welch home; but her 
degree of attention was insufficient as she thought nothing of his 
behavior (T. 46-47). Her degree of attention was heightened after 
she heard her neighbor holler, but the criminal was running to his 
car and got no closer than twenty feet (T. 51). It could only have 
been but a brief second when she saw his face as he glanced at her 
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while running (T. 47). Her attention was further directed from the 
suspect when she focused on obtaining the license plate number of 
the blue and white car (T. 49). 
Mrs. Luna's prior description was inaccurate. She 
initially described the suspect as near twenty-five years of age 
(T. 87); Mr. Pacheco is currently forty-two years old. She 
described the clothing as "a red checked shirt that looked like 
tweed material and beige colored pants" (T. 51). That description 
is quite generic; such clothing could be found in closets of most 
homes. In fact, police who executed the search warrant for clothing 
from Mr. Pacheco's home took more than just two items because 
nothing was so plainly identical to the description she had given 
(T. 80-81). At trial, she could only testify that from a garbage 
bag of clothing presented to her, two of the items "looked like the 
clothes he had on" (T. 55). 
Mrs. Luna's level of certainty became much stronger as 
the identification process wore on. However, the suggestive nature 
of that process utilized by Officer LaMont substantially diminishes 
the value of this factor as it applied to this case. Moreover, the 
Utah Supreme Court has issued a recent opinion which discloses 
inherent problems of eyewitness identification; among the problems 
acknowledged by the Supreme Court is that "the accuracy of an 
identification is, at times, inversely related to the confidence 
with which it is made." State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 490 (Utah 
1986) (citing R. Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, 15 Jurimetrics J. 
171, 184 (1975) (reprinted from 231 Scientific American 23 (Dec. 
- 14 -
1974))). Mrs. Luna's pattern of identification fits within this 
concern. Accordingly, this factor should carry little, if any, 
weight in the balancing. 
Finally, the length of time between the crime and the 
confrontation demonstrates that Mrs. Luna's belated identification 
is suspect despite the suggestive and presumptuous process utilized 
by police. The offense occurred on April 7, 1987 (R. 96). 
Mrs. Luna testified that about a week—possibly two days—after the 
crime, she saw a photospread but could not make a positive 
identification (T. 63-64, 79). Mrs. Luna testified that the second 
photospread was shown to her a week or two later—maybe a month 
(T. 64). Officer LaMont stated the second photospread and 
subsequent identification occurred in the early part of May 
(T. 79). So, in any event, at least two weeks had passed before a 
positive identification was made. Notably, as short as two days but 
maybe a week after the offense, Mrs. Luna could not identify 
Mr. Pacheco from his photospread. Subsequent identifications 
thereby become suspect. The preliminary hearing identification was 
made in late June (R. 04), the trial over a full year later. 
On balance, the Biggers five factor analysis weighs 
heavily that Mrs. Luna's identification of Mr. Robert Pacheco was 
inherently unreliable. Therefore, her testimony at trial 
identifying him as the perpetrator was ill-based and improper and 
served to support a very substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification. Accordingly, Mr. Pacheco's state and federal due 
process rights were violated mandating that this Court suppress the 
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identification, reverse his convictions and remand the case to the 
District Court for further proceedings. 
POINT II 
EVIDENCE INDICATING PRIOR CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR BY 
MR. PACHECO ERRONEOUSLY REACHED THE JURY 
PREJUDICING HIS RIGHT TO A FUNDAMENTALLY FAIR 
TRIAL AS CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
ADMITTING AND PUBLISHING TO THE JURY A MUG SHOT 
SHOW-UP FOLDER CONTAINING A MUG SHOT OF 
MR. PACHECO. 
Police photographs or mug shots 
have been around for well over a 
half a century and prosecutors have 
avoided using them as borne out by 
the fact that Taylor is the only 
Mississippi case that we can find 
where they were introduced into 
evidence. This case comes on the 
heels of Taylor. We would point 
out before the practice becomes 
widespread, that the use of mug 
shots except when absolutely 
necessary, is inviting error. 
Sloan v. State, 437 So.2d 16, 18 
fn.2 (Miss. 1983). 
At trial, the prosecution introduced a mug shot show-up 
folder containing unedited mug shot photographs of Mr. Pacheco and 
five others (Exhibit 6-S) (T. 60) (see Addendum A for photocopy of 
Exhibit 6-S). Defense counsel immediately objected to both the 
admission and publication of that evidence (T. 59, 92). The trial 
court overruled counsel's objection and the mug shot show-up folder 
reached the jurors (T. 70). Mr. Pacheco contends that the admission 
and publication of his mug shot constitutes reversible error in that 
it suggested prior criminal conduct by him, violating his due 
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process rights as well as Utah evidentiary standards. 
In a line of cases beginning in 1979, the Utah Supreme 
Court has placed limitations on the admissibility of evidence which 
establishes or implies other criminal conduct by the defendant. See 
e.g. State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 192 (Utah 1985); State v. McCumber, 
622 P.2d 738 (Utah 1980); and State v. Gotfrey, 598 P.2d 1325 (Utah 
1979). The Court based these decisions on prohibitions within the 
Rules of Evidence against the use of prior bad acts to prove 
character as well as the due process safeguards guaranteed by both 
the state and federal constitutions operating to secure a 
fundamentally fair trial for every criminal defendant. See e.g. 
McCumber/ 722 P.2d at 356; State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368, 1370 
(Utah 1986); and Saunders, 699 P.2d at 741-42. 
In Saunders, 699 P.2d at 741, the Utah Supreme Court 
noted the Rules of Evidence are designed to protect against undue 
prejudice which would be caused by the jury's knowledge of a 
defendant's other criminal acts. One such rule, Rule 404(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1983), provides: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in 
order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for 
other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
In State v.Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 496 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring in the result, joined in part by Stewart, J., and 
Durham, J.), Justice Zimmerman discussed the application of Rule 
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404(b), as well as Rule 403, to evidence of other crimes.1 He 
pointed out that the present Utah Rules of Evidence follow the 
approach that evidence of prior crimes or bad character is 
disfavored during the guilt phase of a trial. Justice Zimmerman 
further noted: 
[Rule 404(b)] permits introduction of evidence of 
prior crimes or bad acts to prove certain facts 
relevant to pending charges, but only if the 
evidence is admissible under rule 403, i.e., only 
if the danger of unfair prejudice does not 
outweigh the probative value of the evidence. 
Id. (footnote omitted). Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
In State v. Holder, 694 P.2d 583 (Utah 1984), the Utah 
Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction under Rule 45, the 
predecessor to Rule 403, because the probative value of evidence of 
a robbery which occurred twenty minutes prior to the incident 
charged was substantially outweighed by the accompanying prejudicial 
effect. The Court pointed out: 
The merely cumulative character of the robbery evidence 
on the element of knowledge and intent regarding the 
theft charge is significant because it highlights the 
limited value this evidence has when weighed against the 
substantial possibility that a jury would be prejudiced 
by evidence of Holder's commission of another crime. 
1
 In State v. Bell, 92 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 26, 30 n.22 
(1988), the Court favorably noted this discussion by Justice 
Zimmerman in State v. Bishop. 
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.Id. at 584. 
Article I, sections 7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution and 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution guarantee due process and a fair trial to a criminal 
defendant. In his concurrence in State v. Bishop, Justice Zimmerman 
pointed out that "[1 language in some of our cases, such as State v. 
Saunders and State v. Tarafa, plainly states that permitting the 
jury to consider otherwise inadmissible bad character evidence for 
the sole purpose of determining guilt denies a defendant due process 
in violation of the state and federal constitutions.n Bishop/ 753 
P.2d at 497. 
The inherently prejudicial nature of mug shot evidence 
has the effect of suggesting to the jury that the defendant was 
involved in prior criminal activity and outweighs any possible 
probative value. As a result, the admission and publication of such 
evidence violates both Rules 403 and 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1983), and the defendant's right to due process under both the 
state and federal constitutions. 
The issue of whether mug shots are inadmissible in a 
criminal prosecution due to their prejudicial effect has never been 
directly decided by this Court.2 In State v. Owens, 388 P.2d 797 
(Utah 1964), the appellant claimed that the trial court erred in 
2
 The paucity of Utah case law dealing with this issue 
despite the fact that mug shots are commonly utilized in criminal 
law enforcement may be indicative of a consensus by trial judges and 
prosecutors that such evidence is inherently prejudicial and 
therefore rarely admitted in a criminal trial. 
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admitting testimony concerning the use of mug shot photographs for 
identification purposes. In Owens, defense counsel did not object 
to the admissibility of the mug shots, and the Court appeared to 
rule on the admissibility of the witness1 prior identification 
rather than the admissibility of the mug shots themselves, icL at 
797-98. 
A careful reading of Owens, however, does not show the 
Court condoning the use of mug shots nor determining their 
admissibility under the predecessor to Rule 404(b). Utah cases 
citing Owens do not refer to it in regard to the admission of mug 
shot photographs; instead, cases which cite Owens rely on its 
holding that once a witness has identified a defendant at trial, the 
evidence of prior identification may also be admissible. See e.g., 
State v. Jiron, 492 P.2d 983 (Utah 1972). 
In a more recent Utah case, State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 
942, 945 (Utah 1982), the appellant claimed that he was denied a 
fair trial where the trial court admitted mug shots as evidence. 
The Utah Supreme Court noted that "McCardell's arguments on this 
point clearly have merit," but the Court did not address the issue 
due to counsel's failure to make a specific objection. J[c[. at 946. 
Unlike Utah, other jurisdictions have examined the 
appropriateness of mug shot photographs in the trial setting. The 
District of Columbia Circuit Court has addressed the universally 
recognized characteristics of the mug shot and the accompanying 
inference of criminal activity. In Barnes v. U.S., 365 F.2d 509 
(D.C. Cir. 1966), the court commented: "The double-shot picture, 
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with front and profile shots alongside each other, is so familiar, 
from 'wanted1 posters in the post office, motion pictures and 
television, that the inference that the person involved has a 
criminal record or has at least been in trouble with the police, is 
natural, perhaps automatic." Ici. at 510-11. 
In accord, the Colorado Supreme Court has criticized the 
use of mug shots even where they have been doctored to exclude the 
information contained in the legend because they "necessarily import 
prior criminality to the defendant. . . . " People v. Bugarin, 507 
P.2d 879 (Colo. 1973). Similarly, the court in Blue v. State, 235 
N.E.2d 471 (Ind. 1968), recognized the strong negative connotation 
associated with the mug shot photograph: "These photographs are 
highly prejudicial upon sight and may very easily create an 
unfavorable automatic reaction in a juror's mind without further 
investigation by him." 235 N.E.2d at 474. 
In State v. Kutzen, 620 P.2d 259 (Hawaii App. 1980), the 
admission into evidence of photos consisting of double-shot frontal 
and profile views of each defendant, with white paper folded and 
stapled over the lower portion of the photos, constituted reversible 
error where the State's entire case relied on the identification of 
one eyewitness. In State v. Moore, 495 P.2d 448 (Ariz. 1972), the 
Arizona Supreme Court held that even the verbalization of the words 
"mug shot" when referring to a photograph was reversible error as an 
inference of prior criminal activity. The Moore court further 
approved a previous Arizona Court of Appeals decision which held as 
prejudicial error the admission of a mug shot where the legend was 
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removed but consisted of a double-shot frontal and profile photo. 
State v. Cumbo, 451 P.2d 333 (Ariz. App. 1969). 
In Johnson v. Commonwealth, 345 S.E.2d 303 (Va. App. 
1986)/ the court surveyed various jurisdictions regarding the 
instant issue. It noted that a three-prong test utilized by the 
court in United States v. Harrington, 490 F.2d 487 (2nd Cir. 1973), 
seemed the most satisfactory approach and concluded that "[m]ost of 
the federal and state courts that have had occasion to rule upon the 
subject in recent years have commented upon [the Harrington] 
standards with approval, and there has been virtually no criticism 
of them." Johnson, 345 S.E.2d at 307. In Harrington, the court 
enunciated the following three-prong test for the admissibility of 
mug shots: 
1) The Government must have a demonstrable need 
to introduce the photographs* and 
2) The photographs themselves, if shown to the 
jury, must not imply that the defendant has a 
prior criminal record; and 
3) The manner of introduction at trial must be 
such that it does not draw particular attention to 
the source or implications of the photographs. 
Harrington, 490 £n.2d at 495. The Johnson court, after applying 
Harrington's three-prong test, found reversible error where the 
defendant's unexcised mug shot was admitted and published because of 
the implication of a prior criminal record. 
Applying the Harrington tripartite test to the instant 
case yields a finding that the admissibility of the defendant's mug 
shot is reversible error. The first prong requiring a demonstrable 
need for the introduction of the mug shot fails for a variety of 
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reasons. First/ the mug shots were introduced in the State's case 
in chief, and as Wharton's criminal evidence treatise elucidates, 
"When evidence of other crimes is offered in chief, it violates not 
only the rule of policy which forbids the State initially to attack 
the character of the accused, but also the rule that bad character 
may not be shown by evidence of particular acts." Wharton's 
Criminal Evidence 13th ed. §240 at 535 (citations omitted). 
Second, the only plausible demonstrable need profferable 
by the State is that of identification under the rubric of the 
identity exception of Rule 404(b). Even assuming, arguendo, that 
this argument is at all viable, the posture of Utah case law as 
discussed supra illustrates that Rule 404(b) must also comply within 
the boundaries of Rule 403. Case law discussed above rejects that 
possibility. Moreover, in Commonweath v. Trowery, 235 A.2d 171, 
172-73 (Pa. Super. 1967), the court addressed this issue resolutely: 
The Commonwealth argues that this evidence is not 
adduced to show the commission of the particular 
crime charged, but merely for the purpose of 
identification, and therefore its admission does 
not constitute reversible error. This argument 
weakens rather than strengthens the Commonwealth's 
case, for in a real sense evidence of prior crimes 
may have probative value in proving the commission 
of the crime charged, but is excluded because the 
prejudice stemming from its introduction far 
overshadows that value. In a case where the 
evidence is introduced merely for the purpose of 
identification, most of the probative value of the 
evidence is lost while the prejudicial effect 
remains undiminished. 
Third, the mug shot was merely cumulative evidence. 
Mrs. Luna had already identified Mr. Pacheco and an officer 
testified that she had picked him from a photospread. Although this 
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identification is challenged jji toto in Point I of this brief, if 
that identification is allowed, the use of the mug shots, at best, 
was cumulative and inadmissible under Rule 403 on that basis as well 
as the inherent prejudice already discussed. This first factor of 
Harrington balances to find that the trial court erred in admitting 
the photographs. 
The second and third factors similarly weigh that 
prejudicial error occurred when the Court admitted the mug shots and 
allowed them to be published to the jury. As discussed, supra, in 
the case law, a mug shot inherently suggests prior crimes or 
criminal record. In Harrington, the Court found reversible error 
and that the photographs failed the second and third prongs because 
the mug shots were inartfully masked. Likewise, the Johnson court 
found reversible error where the mug shot was admitted unexcised as 
the legend would alert the jurors to the nature of the photograph 
with the implication of prior criminal activity. 345 S.E.2d at 
308. See, also, State v. Tate, 341 S.E.2d 380 (S.C. 1986); and 
Sloan v. State, 437 So.2d 16 (Miss. 1983). 
In the instant case, an analysis would similarly warrant 
reversal under Harrington, et. al. The photospread was unmistakably 
a mug shot, unexcised and highly prejudicial. The exhibit was even 
identified as a mug shot as the title read, "'MUG1 SHOW-UP FOLDER." 
The profiles of each photograph were also attached and easily 
visible with a simple removal of a paperclip—something the Court 
expressed concern over but left unchanged (T. 60-61). Both the 
second and third factors of Harrington balance in favor of the need 
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to reverse the trial court's error. 
Admitting the mug shot folder into evidence and 
publishing the same to the jury implied that the defendant was a bad 
person and that he had prior convictions. Because there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury would have reached a different 
conclusion absent the mug shot evidence, Mr. Pacheco's convictions 
should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY 
DENYING MR. PACHECO'S PRETRIAL MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS. 
Prior to trial, Mr. Pacheco moved to suppress evidence of 
prior convictions under Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
(R. 37). That motion was presumably denied. No minute entry or 
transcription reflects that denial, but discussion between the Court 
and both counsel at sentencing reveals pretrial motions apparently 
were dealt with off the record in chambers (T. 3-10).3 Despite the 
denial of Mr. Pacheco's motion to suppress, Mr. Pacheco still 
decided to testify at trial so that his story might be heard. 
Therefore, in an effort to reduce the negative impact of the prior 
conviction evidence on the jury, counsel for Mr. Pacheco took the 
strategic position of introducing the prior convictions during the 
defendant's direct testimony. Mr. Pacheco thereby admitted a prior 
3
 This citation refers to the sentencing transcript. 
Specifically, at page four of that transcript, counsel refers to a 
motion brought by the State to introduce prior burglary involvements 
and possible admissions by Mr. Pacecho that he denied having made. 
That motion is also not supported by a minute entry record or 
transcription. 
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felony conviction in 1981 of Attempted Burglary (T. 115)* This 
strategy was employed by counsel so that the shock value of prior 
criminal conduct could be minimized and so that the defendant would 
not be seen to be hiding something which then would be dramatically 
uncovered during cross-examination.4 
Mr. Pacheco was being tried on two charges. Burglary and 
Theft. Allowing admittance of a prior Attempted Burglary conviction 
seven years old violated Rule 609 and prejudiced Mr. Pacheco's right 
to a fair trial. 
Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states in 
pertinent part: 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of 
attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence 
4
 Mr. Pacheco acknowledges case precedent which implies a 
waiver of the claim of error in denying the motion to not allow 
impeachment by prior convictions if the prior conviction is brought 
out on direct as opposed to cross-examination. However, Mr. Pacheco 
contends that such cases are pre-Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 
(1984), cases, and because Luce and State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 
(Utah 1987), now require that a defendant must take the stand in his 
own behalf to preserve a claim, those cases which imply a waiver 
should be strongly resisted. 
Policy considerations and fundamental fairness demand 
that if the defendant must take the stand to preserve a claim for 
appeal, counsel may employ a strategy to bring out the prior 
convictions on direct examination. To do otherwise would grant 
unwarranted advantage to the State. The jury would doubtfully 
understand the legal technicality forbidding the defendant from 
being completely truthful and honest with the jury about prior 
convictions; and when such information was "uncovered" by the State 
on cross-examination, the jury would subconsciously, if not 
consciously, discount the credibility of the defendant. The jury 
would infer from the defendant's conduct an intent on his part to 
hide or hope to hide the information of prior convictions. 
This Court should therefore not foreclose Mr. Pacheco's 
appeal on this issue based on antiquated legal reasoning which 
contradicts the defendant's desire to testify and deliver his story 
to the jury who will determine his guilt or innocence. 
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that he has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted if elicited from him or established by 
public record during cross-examination but only if 
the crime (1) was punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law 
under which he was convicted, and the court 
determines that the probative value of admitting 
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to 
the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false 
statement, regardless of the punishment. 
Mr. Pacheco's prior felony for Attempted Burglary does not fit 
within the rule as allowable impeachment evidence. Subsection (1) 
of Rule 609(a) allows admission of the prior conviction only after 
the Court performs a balancing test of the probative value of the 
evidence as against its prejudicial effect. The Utah Supreme Court 
and this Court have both addressed the (a)(1) question in recent 
decisions. See State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986); State v. 
Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987); State v. Wight, Case No. 
870558-CA (Utah App. 12/1/88). Each case discusses the five factor 
balancing test the trial court must utilize to determine 
admissibility of the conviction. 
An application of the Banner court's five factors to 
Mr. Pacheco's case could only have found the evidence to have been 
inadmissible. Both Banner and Gentry support that the third factor, 
the similarity of the prior crime to the crime charged, would be 
dispositive of this issue. In Banner, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
[I]t is particularly important when, as here, the 
prior conviction is for the same type of crime 
involved in the matter under present 
consideration. In this type of situation, the 
probative value of the evidence as effecting the 
party's credibility will rarely outweigh the 
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resulting confusion of the issues in dispute and 
the prejudice to the party, 
717 P.2d at 1334 n. 44 (emphasis in original) (citing Terry v. ZCMI, 
605 P.2d 314, 325 (Utah 1979)). In Banner, the prior convictions 
were for Assault with Intent to Commit Rape and the current charges 
were sexual in nature against a child victim. The Court stated the 
close relationship of the crimes would be "extremely prejudicial and 
[would] tend to inflame the jury. . . ." 717 P.2d at 1335. In 
Gentry, the Court found a prior conviction of Rape and a current 
charge of Aggravated Sexual Assault to be "highly likely to 
prejudice jurors and unduly influence their conclusion concerning 
defendant's guilt." 747 P.2d at 1037. 
In the instant case, Mr. Pacheco's prior crime was for 
Attempted Burglary and Burglary was the current charge. The prior 
conviction evidence duplicating the current charge is even more 
inflammatory than either Banner or Gentry with the resulting 
prejudice requiring the trial court to exclude the prior conviction 
under the (a)(1) theory.5 
5
 Although claiming the third factor to be dispositive, 
Mr. Pacheco does not concede the others weigh against him. Rather, 
Mr. Pacheco asserts that Attempted Burglary is not a crime which 
affects character and veracity (factor 1). The fact the conviction 
was seven years old also supports the need to have had it suppressed 
(factor 2). See Banner at 1335, and Gentry at 1038, where 
convictions of eight and nine-plus years, and five years, 
respectively, were found too remote to have weighed in favor of 
admission. This case hinged on identification and was absent of 
nontestimonial evidence (factor 4) such that Mr. Pacheco's testimony 
was too important to have been encumbered by prior convictions not 
indicative of a propensity to not tell the truth (factor 5). On 
balance, the other Banner factors also support the need to have 
suppressed the conviction under the (a)(1) theory. 
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Under the (a)(2) theory, the prior conviction of Attempted 
Burglary could only have come in if Attempted Burglary is a crime of 
dishonesty or false statement. The Utah Supreme Court has not yet 
authored an opinion on the definition of "crimes of dishonesty or 
false statement" since adopting the new rules of evidence in 1983.^ 
This Court, however, very recently ruled that Robbery was not a 
crime of dishonesty or false statement. State v. Wight, Case No. 
870558-CA at 9 (Utah App. 12/1/88). 
Utah's Rule 609 is a verbatim replica of the federal rule, 
and federal case law offers additional guidance to support that 
Attempted Burglary is also not a crime of dishonesty or false 
statement as meant by Rule 609(a)(2). 
In United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976), 
which the Utah Supreme Court cited favorably in the 609(a)(1) 
State v. Banner decision, the circuit court discussed in detail the 
legislative history of Rule 609(a) pointing out the heated debate 
6 This issue is currently before the Utah Supreme Court 
in State v. Bruce, Case No. 860325 (argued February 8, 1988). 
In State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 33 (Utah 1984), the Court 
issued a per curiam opinion concluding that theft impliedly involves 
dishonesty. However, Cintron was decided under the old rules of 
evidence, Rule 21, and that position is contrary to the current 
direction and fresh start of the new rules. Moreover, Cintron is 
unsupported and remains inconsistent with the purpose of the current 
rules as well as case precedents. In State v. Banner, 717 P.2d at 
1334 n.40, the Utah Supreme Court indicated that to the extent 
previous opinions are inconsistent with the new direction taken by 
the Utah Rules of Evidence, they should be overruled. Cintron is 
old law and should play no role in the decision now before this 
Court. The recent opinion from this Court in State v. Wight, Case 
No. 870558-CA at p.7 n.2 (Utah App. 12/1/88), acknowledged that case 
law predating the adoption of the new rules do not bind the Court's 
interpretation for the fresh start of the new rules. 
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which spawned the formulation of the rule. That court quoted the 
Conference Committee Report which stated: 
By the phrase "dishonesty and false statement" the 
Conference means crimes such as perjury or 
subornation of perjury, false pretense, or any 
fraud, embezzlement, or false pretense, or any 
other offense in the nature of crimen falsi, the 
commission of which involves some element of 
deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on 
the accused's propensity to testify truthfully. 
United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d at 362 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 
93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code 
Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 7098, 7103). Footnote 26 of the Smith 
opinion discussed in detail the history of crimen falsi concluding 
that the crime of Attempted Burglary committed by Mr. Pacheco would 
not qualify under the crimen falsi designation. J[d. at 362-63. 
Another opinion from the same circuit gave further light 
on what Congress" intent was with regards to Rule 609(a)(2). In a 
statement from the Court in United States v. Millings, 535 F.2d 121 
(D.C. Cir. 1976), which is also applicable to the prior Attempted 
Burglary conviction of Mr. Pacheco, the Court reasoned: 
Although it may be argued that any wilful 
violation of law . . . evinces a lack of character 
and a disregard for all legal duties, including 
the obligations of an oath, Congress has not 
accepted that expansive theory. 
535 F.2d at 123. The intent of Congress was to limit the 
introduction of prior convictions for impeachment purposes only to 
those crimes which bear directly on a witness1 propensity to not 
tell the truth. Otherwise, one could argue, as discounted in 
Millings, that any crime could be introduced to impeach. As the 
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Millings court unequivocally stated, Congress simply did not intend 
to adopt such an expansive position. The prior Attempted Burglary 
conviction of Mr. Pacheco does not bear on his propensity to tell or 
not tell the truth; they show no deceit or dishonesty as meant by 
Congress • 
in United States v. Glenn, 667 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 
1982), the court held that the crimes of Burglary and Grand Theft 
were not admissible under Rule 609(a)(2) without a showing of 
accompanying fraudulent or deceitful conduct. The burden rests with 
the State to make such a showing. Generally, the court observed 
that crimes of violence, theft crimes and crimes of stealth do not 
involve "dishonesty or false statement" within the proper meaning of 
Rule 609(a)(2). 
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has held that prior 
convictions for second degree Burglary could not be used for 
impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a)(2) because a prior Burglary 
does not bear upon a witness1 propensity to testify truthfully. The 
court ruled that Burglary did not involve "dishonesty or false 
statement" of the credibility-deteriorating quality contemplated by 
Rule 609(a)(2). United States v. Seamster, 568 F.2d 188 (10th Cir. 
1978). 
The only Utah opinion discussing whether Burglary is a 
crime of dishonesty or false statement within the meaning of Rule 
609(a)(2) is Judge Jackson's dissenting opinion in State v. 
Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217, 222 n.2 '(Utah App. 1988) (Jackson, J. 
Dissenting). While the majority in Morehouse does not address the 
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Rule 609(a)(2) issue, the dissent in footnote 2 adopts the 
above-described line of cases and remains the only authoritative 
discussion of the (a)(2) Burglary question by a Utah court, 
Mr. Pacheco's prior conviction of Attempted Burglary was 
not admissible under either theory of Rule 609. The trial court's 
error in denying Mr. Pacheco's motion to suppress his prior 
conviction resulted in prejudice. The appropriate standard for 
review is whether "there was 'a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result for the defendant.'" State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d at 
1038 (citations omitted). Because the Court permitted Mr. Pacheco 
to be impeached through a nearly identical prior conviction, the 
jury likely utilized that information rather than the evidence to 
convict. Absent that error, the outcome likely would have been more 
favorable for Mr. Pacheco. Accordingly, this Court should find 
reversible error and remand this case for a new trial with the prior 
conviction excluded. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE CONVICTIONS OF MR. PACHECO. 
The standard employed for reviewing the sufficiency of 
evidence and reversing a jury verdict is well established. In 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated, n[N]ot withstanding the presumptions in favor of the 
jury's decision this Court still has the right to review the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict." Further, the 
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Court noted: 
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime for which he was convicted. 
Id. This standard restates the due process requirement which 
prohibits a criminal conviction in any case except upon proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime 
with which the defendant is charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 
307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
In Mr. Pacheco's case, all four witnesses who were 
present at the scene testified that the perpetrator ran fast and 
that he jumped over a cement retaining wall (T. 18-19, 22, 26, 29, 
37, 47). Also, they each gave descriptions referring to the suspect 
as young (T. 21, 30, 42, 87). Two witnesses, Mr. and Mrs. Welch, 
never made an identification. One witness, Mrs. Eward, did identify 
a young man from a police photospread (T. 21), and Mrs. Luna, who 
was the only eyewitness to make an identification of Mr. Pacheco, 
originally described the culprit to be twenty-five years old 
(T. 87). She also failed to positively identify Mr. Pacheco as the 
burglar from a photospread within a week of the crime (T. 62-63, 79). 
Mr. Pacheco is forty-two years old (T. 113). He denied 
committing the Burglary and Theft charges against him, asserting to 
have loaned his blue and white car to his son, Troy Allen Chancier, 
age twenty-three, on the day that this crime occurred (T. 116, 
124). Testimony was introduced by the defense that Troy Chancier 
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and Mr. Pacheco are of similar size and description (T. 103, 110). 
More importantly, Mr. Pacheco, his girlfriend and his 
mother each testified that Mr. Pacheco is incapable of running due 
to ankle surgery he underwent in 1984 (T. 100-02, 112, 117). 
Medical reports substantiated those claims and were introduced and 
supplied to the jury (Exhibits D-10 and D-ll (T. 114, 119). 
Mr. Pacheco's medical reports substantiated doctor care for surgery 
in 1984, which required a pin placement, and rheumatoid arthritis in 
his ankle and his hand. 
Inasmuch as the State conceded in closing argument that 
this case hinged on the sole issue of identification (T. 134), 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
Mr. Pacheco, a man of forty-two years of age who could not run (let 
alone run fast or jump over a cement bank), was the young man who 
committed the Welch burglary. 
Accordingly, this Court has the right to review the 
evidence, find it to be insufficient to support the verdict, and 
reverse the convictions of Mr. Pacheco. 
CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the Appellant, 
Mr. Robert Pacheco, requests this Court to reverse his convictions 
of Burglary and Theft and remand this case with an order either for 
a new trial absent the errors herein or a dismissal of the charges. 
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